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 Geographical coverage: 79 regions out of 83 (at the time of the study) 
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Introduction1 
The idea that high quality of government is of the utmost importance for sustained positive social 
outcomes is widely accepted by both the academic community and practitioners (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; World Bank 1997; United Nations 2000). How-
ever, the big question as to what constitutes a government that enhances welfare for all members of 
society remains largely open.  
 
In this debate most attention has been paid to what we call the input side of political institutions, 
that is, for instance, electoral systems, number of veto players, party system and institutionalization 
(North and Weingast 1989; Tsebelis 2002). There are also several high quality datasets on the input 
sides (see Marshal et al 2014; Keefer 2012; Teorell et al 2015). However, the impact of the rules of 
the game on the "output" side of the political system, in particular the role of bureaucracy, still 
receives much less attention.2 
 
A major stumbling block on the way to understanding the role of bureaucracy in human develop-
ment is the lack of comparative observational data on the organizational design of public bureau-
cracies and bureaucratic behavior. The problem seems to persist over time. Thus, in 1996, Bekke, 
Perry and Toonen stated that our basic knowledge of bureaucratic structures is “woefully inade-
quate” (vii) and, in 2012, Francis Fukuyama expressed a seemingly similar sentiment in a piece enti-
tled “The strange absence of the state in political science”. 
 
Notwithstanding a seminal effort by Peter Evans and James Rauch in mapping the bureaucratic 
structure in 35 less developed countries for the 1970-1990 period (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Rauch 
and Evans, 2000), the lack of empirical data pertaining to bureaucratic organization and practices is 
a well-known problem (Lewis 2007; Miller and Whitford 2010; Rubin and Whitford 2008).  
With the aim of addressing this important empirical gap, in 2011 the Quality of Government Insti-
tute began a longitudinal project to collect data on the organizational design of public bureaucracies 
and bureaucratic behavior in the countries of the world – the QoG Expert Survey. The QoG Ex-
pert Survey I was completed in 2011 (Dahlberg et al 2013). In 2014 the QoG Institute launched the 
                                                     
1
 We would like to thank all the experts who took part in the study, without their help this research would not have been 
possible. We’d also like to thank our colleagues at the QoG Institute and the National Research University - Higher 
School of Economics, who helped to conduct the survey. 
2
 With the exception of a few pioneering theoretical (Miller 2000; Rothstein and Teorell 2008) and empirical research 
(Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000; Dahlström et al 2012). 
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second edition of the cross-country survey (Dahlström et al 2015) and a similar survey on the quali-
ty of government in Russia’s regions - the Expert Survey on the Quality of Government in Russia’s 
Regions (Russia’s Regions QoG Expert Survey) – in collaborationwith the Laboratory for Political 
Studies at the National Research Institute – Higher School of Economics. 
 
The aim of the Russian project is to document the structural characteristics of public bureaucracy 
and bureaucratic behavior in Russia’s regions. There are several reasons to enquire beneath the 
national level. First, and perhaps most importantly, theories tested with cross-national comparisons 
almost always draw information initially from differences between the same countries, and as force-
fully argued by King, Keohane and Verba (1994), making theories less restrictive after empirical 
observations in one dataset requires new data in order for the theory to be properly tested. It oth-
erwise comes close to data fitting, which in turn increases the risk of omitted variable bias. Second, 
there are good reasons to believe that within country differences are as important as between coun-
try differences (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2015). In a worldwide analysis explaining variation 
in economic development and productivity, Gennaioli et al (2011) find that sub-national explanato-
ry factors often trump national level factors. Cross-national comparisons miss this variability as 
they trust the less informative country mean and thus expose themselves to what has been called 
the “whole-nation-bias” (Rokkan 1970). Snyder (2001) underlines that, as comparativists are natu-
rally limited by data availability, they need to increase the number of cases as much as possible, and 
sub-national comparison offers a particularly promising avenue for doing so. 
 
The Russia’s` Regions QoG Expert Survey is based on the theoretical and methodological founda-
tions of the QoG Expert Survey. At the same time, the survey was adjusted to the Russian context, 
resulting in some questions and indeed whole chapters being considerably transformed. Thus, for 
instance, unlike the cross-country survey that focuses on public sector employees, the subject of the 
Russian project is only the personnel of the regional governments, therefore numerous employees 
on the state’s payroll but outside the government departments and agencies (such as teachers, doc-
tors and employees of the state owned enterprises) were excluded. The questionnaire also includes 
several topics that are relevant to the Russian politico-administrative context, in particular concern-
ing public service delivery, decision-making process and public procurement tenders. 
This report provides information on the questionnaire design and data collection, a summary of the 
data, including the respondents’ characteristics, evaluation of potential respondent perception bias, 
and some preliminary results of the data analysis.  
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Questionnaire design 
 
The purpose of the Russia’s Regions QoG Expert Survey’s questionnaire was to document organi-
zational design and bureaucratic behavior in Russian regional governments. The subject of the sur-
vey is consequently the regional level bureaucracy of the executive branch. The questionnaire re-
flects the major conceptual frameworks of the organizational design of bureaucracy and bureaucrat-
ic behavior existing in modern public administration, such as neo-Weberianism (Evans and Rauch 
1999, 2000; Miller 2000), New Public Management (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), Governance (Os-
borne 2006, 2010) and impartiality in the execution of authority (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), since 
the literature suggests that elements of all of those trends are observable in the post-Soviet devel-
opment of Russia’s public administration (Gadzieva 2012; Nistotskaya 2014; Verheijen and Dobro-
lubova 2007 among others).  
 
Methodologically the survey is anchored in expert perceptions of the state of affairs in a region’s 
bureaucracy. The majority of the substantive questions are formulated as statements about the or-
ganizational design of bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior in a given region. These statements 
are either legal provisions in force (for example such as about recruitment based on professional 
knowledge and skills in q1_1), findings in the published research on the Russian public bureaucracy 
(Barabashev and Straussman 2007; Brown, Early and Gehlbach 2009; Brym and Gimpelson 2004; 
Huskey 2004; Nistotskaya 2009, 2014; Solomon 2008; Taylor 2011; Yakovlev and Demidova 2010; 
Zobnin 2011 among others) or news and reports from reputable international and Russia media 
(Kotova 2012; Lutova 2013; Zakharov and Popov 2010 among others). Experts were invited to 
indicate the extent to which these statements correspond to reality in the region of their expertise 
on a pre-defined scale of answers (1- Hardly ever (Absolutely disagree), 7 – Almost always (Abso-
lutely agree)). The seven-point scale with pre-defined endpoints is utilized for all but two items. The 
two exceptions are item 2, concerning replacement of public sector employees, and questions 5.5.1 
– 5.5.9 of item 5 (public service delivery), where experts are asked to give unprompted quantitative 
answers, which is more akin to Evans and Rauch’s (1999) approach. 
 
The thrust of this methodological approach is in the quality of expert knowledge, and an under-
standing that inevitable idiosyncrasies between the evaluations of individual experts, who assess the 
same regional bureaucracy, would be cancelled out once averaged. Indeed, as indicated by the ex-
tensive test of respondent perception bias reported below, there are just a few instances where the 
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personal characteristics of the respondents systematically predict their assessments. In other words, 
the survey design seems not to be a serious threat to the validity of the resultant indicators. 
 
Another important issue of the questionnaire concerns the actual subject of the study. Distinctively 
from the cross-country QoG Expert Survey, the majority of the Russia’s regions QoG Expert Sur-
vey’s questions pertain only to the personnel of the regional governments (the executive branch of 
the regional level authority). In other words, people employed in the state funded public health or 
educational organizations remained outside the boundaries of the project. Moreover, only those 
positions in the regional bureaucracy that are invested with the power of the state were investigated, 
thereby auxiliary personnel (drivers, typists and such like), was excluded. The majority of questions 
relate to the positions known as “specialists” and “supporting specialists”, which constitute more 
than 75% of all personnel in the executive branch of the regional level of government (Nistotskaya 
2014, 147). From a formal-legal point of view, hiring, firing and promotion in these positions are 
governed by the principles of meritocracy, implying open contest entry to the bureaucracy, and 
security of tenure (FZ-79). However, a set of questions explicitly focuses on the category of posts 
known as “managers” (rukovoditeli) – i.e. those who occupy such positions as heads and deputy 
heads of the structural units of regional governments. The personnel management in these posts 
could be best described as an “at will” system. 
 
The structure of the questionnaire in the Russian survey is quite similar to its cross-country proto-
type. The individual questions are grouped together to form internally cohesive items (see Appen-
dix D). There are seven substantive items:  
 recruitment and career (12 questions) 
 replacement of bureaucrats (3 question) 
 terms and conditions of work (5 questions) 
 impartiality (3 questions) 
 public service provision (7 questions) 
 public procurement (2 questions) 
 decision-making at the regional level (10 questions) 
 
There are also two technical items: 1) selection of the region of expertise (1 question) and 2) expert 
demographic profile and self-evaluation (4 questions).  
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The experts themselves selected the region of their expertise: a region of birth, workplace or resi-
dence. A list of regions that were selected by at least one expert can be found in Appendix B. In 
addition to the standard demographic questions, the final section includes expert self-evaluation on 
all seven substantive sections of the questionnaire.  
 
The data collection 
 
Procedure 
 
The questionnaire was designed in Russian and pre-tested February to April 2014. The pre-test 
suggested a slight change in the wording of the questions on public procurement and in some of 
the questions in the terms and conditions of work item of the questionnaire. 
 
The survey was administrated online with the help of Qualtrics software. Similarly to the protocol 
of the cross-country QoG Expert Survey, in order to encourage participation each prospective 
respondent received a personalized email with information about the survey and a request to partic-
ipate in it. Only those experts who responded positively to the information letter were sent a per-
sonalized link to the online questionnaire. This three-step procedure (information letter – expert’s 
response – questionnaire) made it possible to recruit those experts who were genuinely interested in 
the study.  The experts participated in the survey on a voluntary basis, i.e. pro bono. 
 
Recruitment 
 
Recruitment commenced in June 2014. At this stage the list of prospective experts included the 
academic staff from leading regional universities whose research interests included public admin-
istration, members of non-governmental and non-profit organizations, journalists, representatives 
of business structures and political parties, regional elected and non-elected officials. The academic 
staffs were identified on the basis of an extensive literature review in Russian and English on public 
administration, governance and civil service in Russia. Information letters were also sent to the 
regional offices of several prominent NGOs (Transparency International, Golos (Voice), the 
Committee of Civic Initiatives, Moscow School of Civil Education) and academic associations (the 
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Russian Association of Political Science, PANERA – Russian Academy of National Economics and 
Public Administration).  
 
A new effort to recruit experts was launched in autumn 2014, during which regional offices of the 
association of Russian entrepreneurs "OPORA", the political parties "Yabloko" and the "Party of 
Progress", the National Union of Political Scientists and the Union of Journalists were contacted. 
With the exception of the "Party of Progress", the response from these organizations was rather 
timid.  
 
The project was presented at a workshop of the Russian Association of Political Science “Modern 
political reality and the state: complex research methods" (Anapa, Russia, October 2014), attended 
by colleagues from various regions of Russia, who actively facilitated the recruitment of new ex-
perts. In addition, a review of a number of regional academic journals, and documentation about 
applicants and recipients of research grants from Russia’s major research funding organizations (the 
Russian Research Fund for Social Sciences and Humanities and the Russian Foundation for Basic 
Research) rendered several dozens of names of prospective experts. 
 
The final effort to recruit new experts was undertaken at the end of 2014. It was focused exclusive-
ly on those regions that had been evaluated by less than three experts. Up until the end of the year 
the search for experts on Internet open sources and through the professional networks of the 
scholars at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg and the Laboratory 
for Political Studies at the Higher School of Economics continued.  In July and November 2014 
experts who had agreed to participate but did not complete the questionnaire received a reminder.  
Through June 2014 – January 2015, 2894 information emails were sent out. Each of the experts 
received a personalized email with a description of the research and an emphasis on the fundamen-
tal role that their expertise played in the success of the project. Some 10% of emails were returned 
as undelivered. In total, the number of experts responding positively to the invitation to participate 
in the survey was 466. These were sent subsequent emails with the link to the questionnaire. 336 
experts started the survey and 311 completed it (see Figure 1). Therefore, the effective response rate 
is 66.7%. 
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FIGURE 1, NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES SENT, STARTED AND COMPLETED 
 
 
 
The data 
 
Data from the Russia’s Regions QoG Expert Survey includes information for 79 regions of the 
Russian Federation. It is based on the expert assessments of 313 respondents, including those who 
answered more than 50% of the questions. Response time ranges from around ten minutes to two 
hours, averaging about 30 minutes. 
 
Only 4% of the experts exited the survey at an early stage, moreover, the majority of those who did 
not complete the questionnaire in full answered most of the questions (see Figure 2).  All eligible 
information provided by the experts was entered into the dataset, irrespective of whether they 
completed the questionnaire or not. Questions answered by fewer than three experts per region 
were denominated as “missing data” in the aggregate dataset. 
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TABLE 1, NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER REGION 
  
N of respondents N of regions 
No experts 4 
One expert 6 
Two experts 9 
Three experts 23 
More than three experts 41 
Total 79 
 
The mean number of respondents per region in the dataset is 4, but the variation is high. 41 regions 
have more than three experts and 19 regions have less than three experts (see Table 1). The hard-
to-reach regions of the Far East and the Far North (Kamchatka, Magadan, Chukotka and Yamal-
Nenets Autonomous district) are those with no experts at all. Geographical coverage of the regions 
in which one or two experts responded includes not only remote areas (like the Nenets Autono-
mous district and the Jewish Autonomous region), but also the regions of Central Russia (Tver, 
Murmansk) and the major scientific and industrial centers of Siberia (Novosibirsk). A complete list 
of the number of experts per region is presented in Appendix B. 
 
FIGURE 2, NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED (N=313) 
 
Note: The figure is based only on the questions with the pre-defined answer scale (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, except questions 5.5.1 – 
5.5.9). The questions that require unprompted responses from experts are excluded (items 5.5.1 – 5.5.9). 
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Assessing respondent perception bias 
 
The average survey respondent is a man (59%) with a Russian research degree (52%). The most 
common employer is a public university (63%), followed by NGOs (13%) and state funded organi-
zations excluding universities (8%). Among the experts responding to the survey there are only 8 
percent employed in public administration (including all branches of the regional and federal levels 
of authority). Three quarter of the respondents (75%) have a research degree.3  
This information provides initial support to the notion that the survey benefited from high quality 
expert knowledge. However, the issue of perception bias is a non-trivial problem in expert surveys, 
because, if expert assessments vary systematically on the observable characteristics of experts, then 
the validity of the data could be in doubt.  
Extensive perception bias checks were carried out to make sure that estimates for a particular re-
gion are not determined by the make-up of the group of experts who provided the assessments, but 
in fact reflect the region’s bureaucratic structure and practices. In practice all items in the question-
naire were regressed on all available characteristics of the respondents, controlling for the regions’ 
fixed effects.4 
 
The results of the regression analyses suggest that, by and large, experts’ characteristics do not af-
fect their perceptions in a systematic way. Of 288 predictors checked, only 25 (or 8.7%) are signifi-
cant at the 95 percent level or higher. This is certainly larger than the 5% due to chance, but still 
sufficiently low to rule out systematic perception bias. For example, the number of predictors that 
have an impact on the assessment of the respondents (statistically significant) in this study is lower 
than in the cross-sectional QoG Expert Survey II: 8.7 percent and 13 percent respectively (Dahl-
ström et al 2015, 13). More importantly, when they appear, the differences are not very large in 
absolute terms (see Appendix B for numerical evidence).  
 
To illustrate the identified perception bias, there is, for example, a tendency among government 
employees to assess their bureaucratic structures differently when compared to the rest of the re-
spondents. It is not surprising that government employees judge, for example, the extent to which 
formal rules governing the recruitment and careers of public administrators are observed in practice 
                                                     
3
 Kandidat nauk or doctor nauk are Russian research degrees and PhD is a research degree achieved outside of Rus-
sia. 
4
 Gender, education, current employer, and expert self-evaluation in the appropriate area.  
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differently than people employed outside government. Neither is it surprising that they tend to 
evaluate their own work a bit more positively than others. This is very similar to the QoG Expert 
Survey II (Dahlström et al 2015, 19). Taking into account that only 8 percent of all respondents are 
elected or non-elected officials and that the final regional indicators consist of evaluations of several 
experts, the influence of this systematic bias on the aggregate regional-level indicators should be 
considered negligible.  
 
There is also a tendency among women to evaluate more positively than men. Although this trend 
is observed in most of the evaluations, its impact in absolute terms is rather small. 
Education level proved to be a non-significant determinant of the respondents’ answers. This fac-
tor is significant in just two cases: q5_3 (independent audit) and q7_1 (the clarity of goals and ob-
jectives in the formulation of regional policies). 
As for the expert self-evaluations, in those rare cases where the indicator appeared significant, re-
spondents with higher self-evaluation of the level of their expertise had, on average,  a more nega-
tive assessment of the question in hand (see Appendix С for detail).  
 
Although the perception bias is normally small in absolute terms, two questionnaire items – public 
service provision (item 5) and regional decision-making (item 7) – are more sensitive to the person-
al characteristics of the respondents than the rest of the questions (see Appendix B). 
 
The results of a respondent perception bias analysis show that despite the fact that systematic bias-
es exist, their occurrence and, more importantly, the absolute values are usually small. Considering 
the fact that the estimates of several experts are included in the final regional rates, the risk of sys-
tematic distortions rooted in the personal characteristics of the respondents, in general is negligible 
in the aggregated data. 
 
Preliminary results 
 
Main trends 
 
In order to demonstrate the scientific value and relevance of the data, the data were first checked 
for internal consistency. First, following a robust finding from the empirical literature (Evans and 
Rauch 1999; Dahlström et al 2012), it was expected that meritocratic entry to bureaucracy, where 
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education, professional experience and professional skills, identified with the help of vacancy con-
tests, decide who gets the job (q1_1), will be negatively correlated with the political and personal-
istic modes of entry (q1_2 and q1_3). As Table 2 shows, this expectation finds solid support in the 
data: a meritocratic type of entry into the civil service (hereinafter Merit) is negatively associated 
with political type (hereinafter PolT) and with a personalized type (hereinafter PerT). The strength 
of the associations between Merit, PolT and PerT suggests that the respondents view PerT as al-
most the opposite to Merit, and while PolT is at odds with Merit too, it is less alien to Merit than 
PerT. In other words, in comparison with the countries of North America and Western Europe, 
where the main threat to the principles of merit and the effectiveness of the bureaucracy comes 
from so-called political appointees (Dahlström 2011; Lewis 2007), in Russia this threat seems to be 
rooted in the personalistic nature of the relationship between those who are already in government 
and those who wish to join the bureaucracy. The dominant nature of such relationships is found in 
в 57 from 79 regions, suggesting that at present Russia’s public bureaucracy is neither a merit, nor a 
spoils system, but a patrimonial bureaucracy (Fukuyama 2013; Weber 1978). 
 
Secondly, in accordance with an increasingly influential literature about the impartiality of public 
bureaucracy as a key characteristic of thriving societies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Rothstein 
2011), it was expected that the relationship between merit and impartiality will be statistically signif-
icant and in a positive direction, and the connection between the two other types of entry to bu-
reaucracy and impartiality will be statistically significant, but in a negative direction.  
 
TABLE 2, PAIRWISE CORRELATION BETWEEN MERIT, POLITICAL AND PERSONALISTIC RE-
CRUITMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Merit PolT PerT 
Merit 1   
PolT -0.34* 1  
 (50)    
PerT -0.66*** 0.39** 1 
 (53)  (52)   
    
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses 
 
Analyzing the degree of impartiality in bureaucratic decision-making in relation to social groups, 
individual applicants and business, we found that meritocratic recruitment in general is highly asso-
ciated with impartial behavior, while PerT, on the contrary, is highly associated with partial behav-
ior (Figure 3, Table 3). Political appointees remain a group that does not have a clearly identifiable 
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behavioral profile when it comes to impartiality: the correlation is in the expected direction (more 
political appointees – less impartiality), but statistically it is significant only in one out of the three 
cases (Table 3). Here it is also interesting to note that the partial behavior of the regional officials is 
rarely directed towards social groups, but is rather focused on individuals and businesses. That also 
seems to be a specific feature of the Russian case.  
 
TABLE 3, MODES OF ENTRY AND IMPARTIALITY 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Impartiality social 
groups 
Impartiality Indi-
vidual applicants 
Impartiality busi-
ness 
    
Merit 0.32* 0.56*** 0.39** 
 (47)  (52)  (44)  
PolT -0.20 -0.32* -0.24 
 (46)  (51) (42) 
PerT -0.20 -0.67*** -0.65*** 
 (49)  (52) (42)  
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses 
 
When, in experts’ opinion, the recruitment contests are just a window dressing exercise (outcomes 
of recruitment contests are pre-determined ahead of contests), this is highly significantly correlated 
with the PerT mode of entry to bureaucracy (similar association with PolT is statistically not signifi-
cant). The correlation between the frequency of recruitment contests (how often formal competi-
tive contests are held) and how often the outcomes of contests are pre-determined is negative at a 
statistically significant level. In other words, the broader the practice of open competitive recruit-
ment contests, the less window dressing such practice is in character (Table 4).  
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FIGURE 3, MERIT AND IMPARTIALITY 
 
Note: the impartiality index is built from three components (impartiality in relation to specific social groups, individual appli-
cants, and business) by principal component analysis, r = 73 
 
 
TABLE 4, MERIT, POLT, PERT, THE SHARE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS IN MERIT POSTS HIRED 
THROUGH VACANCY CONTESTS AND THE SHARE OF PRE-DETERMINED OUTCOMES OF VA-
CANCY CONTESTS  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Merit PolT PerT Share of specialists 
hired by competitions 
     
Share of specialists hired by competitions 0.55** 
(31) 
-0.16 
(28) 
-0.37 
(29) 
1 
     
Share of pre-determined outcomes of vacancy 
contests 
-0.64*** 
(56) 
0.45*** 
(54) 
0.64*** 
(58) 
-0.55** 
(31) 
     
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses  
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Furthermore, in regions where meritocratic principles rein there is also an expectedly high quality of 
related procedures: for example, legal provisions on terms and conditions of work in public bu-
reaucracy tend to be duly observed and information on vacancies is not only published and availa-
ble, but also detailed. However, in regions where competitions seem to be a veneer of merit, other 
relevant legal provisions are also not observed. 
 
FIGURE 4, PRE-DETERMINED OUTCOMES OF PROCUREMENT TENDERS AND PRE-DETERMINED 
OUTCOMES OF RECRUITMENT CONTESTS 
 
 
Moreover, the data suggest that the overall quality of recruitment procedures in public bureaucracy 
is associated with the quality of the subsequent work of bureaucrats, particularly in spheres with 
high risk of corruption. Thus, regions where the outcomes of recruitment contests are viewed by 
the experts as pre-determined are those that are also seen as having too many pre-determined out-
comes in public procurement tenders (Figure 4). On the other hand, merit is highly negatively asso-
ciated with non-competitive public procurement (Table 5). In a similar vein, partiality in bureaucra-
cy goes hand in hand with fraud in public procurement tenders (Table 6). 
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TABLE 5, RECRUITMENT TYPE AND PRE-DETERMINED OUTCOMES OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
CONTRACTS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Merit PerT Pre-determined outcomes of 
vacancy contests  
    
Pre-determined outcomes of public 
procurement tenders 
-0.56*** 
(50) 
0.64*** 
(52) 
0.57*** 
(55) 
 
    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses 
 
TABLE 6, IMPARTIALITY AND PRE-DETERMINED OUTCOMES OF  PUBLIC PROCUREMENT TEN-
DERS 
 
  
VARIABLES q6_2 
  
Partiality towards social groups 0.46** 
(49) 
  
Partiality towards applicants 0.67*** 
(50) 
  
Partiality towards business 0.57*** 
(41) 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  Number of observations in parentheses 
 
In addition to neo-Weberianism, the aim of the survey was to document the occurrence of other 
administrative practices.  Questions 7.9 and 7.10 aimed to gauge the extent of the involvement of 
business organizations and NGOs in the process of regional decision-making. The survey data on 
participatory governance shows that where citizens and businesses are more involved in the process 
of regional decision-making, there are fewer irregularities in recruitment and public procurement 
competitions (q1_13 and q6_2 correspondingly). Similarly, the higher extent of participatory gov-
ernance is found in those regions where Merit is the mode of entry to bureaucracy (PolT is not 
significant again). The experts also noted that the level of partiality is significantly lower in those 
regions where businesses and the public are more engaged in the decision-making process (Table 
7). 
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TABLE 7, PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, INTEGRITY OF GOVERNMENT PROCESSES, IMPAR-
TIALITY AND MODES OF ENTRY TO BUREAUCRACY 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 1_13 6_2 a4_1 a4_2 a4_3 1_1 1_2 1_3 
         
Business participation -0.34* -0.32* 0.27 0.39** 0.35* 0.45** -0.13 -0.44** 
 (53) (47) (43) (50) (41) (47) (46) (50) 
Public participation -0.60*** -0.56*** 0.2 0.51*** 0.46** 0.62*** -0.22 -0.61*** 
 (59) (53) (49) (54) (44) (53) (51) (56) 
         
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses 1_13 – predetermined outcomes of vacancy 
contests, 6_2 – predetermination in procurement tenders results, a4_1 – a4_3 – impartiality 
 
 
In addition to neo-Weberian and Governance features, the survey aimed to assess the extent of the 
institutionalization of New Public Management tools. Considering that strategic planning and per-
formance management (SPPM) is one of the key tenets of NPM (Hood 1991; Pollit 1995), a battery 
of questions was concerned with the implementation of SPPM tools in Russia’s regions (q7_1 – 
q7_4). As Table 8 shows, these tools are mid-to strongly correlated between each other, which 
suggests that where the NPM agenda is adopted, it develops comprehensively in all the adopted 
elements (Table 8). 
 
TABLE 8, CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGIC PLANNING AND PER-
FORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SPPM) IN RUSSIA’S REGIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES q7_1 q7_2 q7_3 q7_4 
     
q7_1 1    
     
q7_2 0.85*** 1   
 (59)    
q7_3 0.62*** 0.65*** 1  
 (55) (54)   
q7_4 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.82*** 1 
 (54) (53) (50)  
     
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses 
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In addition to SPPM processes, New Public Management is also known for its, “Let the managers 
manage” approach (q7_6), pay-for-performance remuneration schemes (q3_2), and outsourcing of 
services to organizations outside formal government structures (q5.1 and q5.2), all of which became 
the subject of study of this project. As Table 9 shows, most of these elements are positively signifi-
cantly correlated between each other, providing additional support for the suggestion about the 
coordinated implementation of the adopted NPM tools across Russia’s regional administrations.  
 
TABLE 9, CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ELEMENTS OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA’S 
REGIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLE  SPPM Index 3_2 7_6 5_1 5_2 
      
SPMS Index  1     
      
q3_2 0.54*** 1    
 (45)     
q7_6 0.42** 0.29* 1   
 (42) (46)    
q5_1 0.63** 0.16 0.17 1  
 (23) (27) (26)   
q5_2 0.57** 0.16 -0.07 0.56** 1 
 (21) (24) (24) (21)  
      
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses. Strategic Planning and Performance 
Management System (SPPM) Index is obtained through principal component analysis of q7_1 – q7_4; 3_2 – salaries are 
linked to performance indicators; 7_6 – managerial autonomy; 5_1 – outsourcing by government agencies; 5_2 – outsourcing in 
state funded organizations that provide public services 
 
 
The expert survey data in the context of the socio-economic development of Russia’s 
regions 
 
A significant obstacle for external validation of the data is the lack of data on organizational design 
and bureaucratic behavior in Russia’s regions. Research projects that at least partially covered these 
issues normally suffer from poor geographic coverage (Khajkin and Popov 2012a, 2012b; Zemlyan-
skaya 2013), or are commercial undertakings whose data is currently unavailable for academic re-
search (see Baranov et al 2015). The lack of suitable data on organizational design and bureaucratic 
behavior in Russia’s regions highlights the uniqueness of the Russia’s Regions QoG Expert Survey, 
which aimed to fill this empirical gap and to introduce a rich dataset to the scientific community, 
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but this also impedes direct external validation of the data. Instead this section reports the results of 
the correlational analysis between the obtained data on bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic 
behavior in Russia’s regions and a set of objective indicators of socio-economic development of 
Russia’ administrative units. The selection of these indicators was guided theoretically by the litera-
ture on bureaucratic structure/behavior.  
 
The first indicator is the quality of life index. Based on the literature that links meritocratic recruit-
ment to high quality of government and human well-being (Rothstein 2011; Rothstein and Teorell 
2008), the assumption is made that the regional practices associated with fair meritocratic recruit-
ment will be positively related to the quality of life of the population in those regions. The quality 
of life indicator is a rating, based on a comprehensive set of various indicators from the official 
statistics of the central and regional governments and other public sources (RIA-Rating 2013). 
The second indicator employed is the investment attractiveness of the regions. In line with the 
existing literature that showed the benefits of meritocratic recruitment for entrepreneurial devel-
opment (Knott and Miller 2006; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2015), a positive significant correlation 
between the indicators pertaining to merit and the investment attractiveness of Russia’s regions was 
expected. Two well-established indices, based on a combination of objective statistical data, expert 
assessments and entrepreneurs’ evaluations, were utilized (NRA 2014; RA-Expert 2014).  
 
Furthermore, two measurements of the innovativeness of Russia’s region were employed to check 
for the notion that in regions where public administration is built on the principles of openness, 
competition and professionalism and not tied by political and/or family considerations, such re-
gions will be rated higher in terms of their propensity to innovate. The first measure is a rating, 
commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation for monitor-
ing and control purposes, and developed by the Association of Innovative Russia’s Regions in col-
laboration with the representatives of regional authorities and leading experts (AIRR 2014). The 
second measure is developed by the Institute for Statistical Studies and Economic Knowledge at 
the Higher School of Economics (NRU HSE 2012).  
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Finally, two indicators – the level of the economic activity of the population5, taken from the state 
statistics service, and a composite measure of the socio-economic situation in Russia’s regions pro-
duced by RIA-rating (Russia’s Regions 2014; RIA-rating 2014) – were employed to demonstrate the 
links between the organizational design of regional public bureaucracies, bureaucratic behavior and 
the socio-economic development of the regions. 
 
The results of the correlation analysis suggest that recruitment practices in Russia’s regional bureau-
cracies are linked with the overall quality of life (Table 10): if meritocratic bureaucracy (Merit and 
1_12) is associated with higher quality of life, then the patrimonial mode of entry is associated with 
lower level of quality of life.  There is significant negative correlation between recruitment based on 
personal relations and the overall socio-economic situation in regions (r = -0.27*, N=59) registers 
the same trend. 
 
TABLE 10, RECRUITMENT TYPE AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN RUSSIA’S REGIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Merit PerT 1_13 1_12 
     
Quality of Life 0.29* -0.33* -0.35** 0.37* 
 (56) (58) (62) (32) 
     
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses. q1_13 – predetermined outcomes of 
vacancy contests; q1_12 – share of formally merit posts that were filled through vacancy contests  
 
 
TABLE 11, THE IMPARTIALITY, RECRUITMENT AND INNOVATIVENESS OF RUSSIA’S REGIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Predetermined outcomes of 
vacancy contests  
Partiality towards 
social groups 
Partiality towards 
applicants 
Partiality towards 
business 
     
Lifequality -0.35** -0.23   -0.26* -0.37* 
 (62) (51) (56) (47) 
Innovations_AIRR -0.26* -0.13   -0.25 -0.37* 
 (63) (52) (57) (47) 
Innovations_HSE -0.22 -0.12   -0.26* -0.46**   
 (63) (52) (57) (47) 
     
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses.  
 
 
                                                     
5
 The level of economic activity of the population is the ratio of the economically active population (the population of the 
country, which has, or is willing and potentially able to have an independent source of income) to the total population of 
the same age group as a percentage. 
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The greater extent of meritocratic recruitment, measured through q1_1 and q1_12, is associated 
with lower investment risk (r = -.27**, N = 57 and r = -.39**, N = 32 correspondingly). A similar 
pattern is found between partiality towards business organizations and investment risk (r = .35**, 
N = 47), suggesting that the quality of bureaucracy factor arguably plays an important role in the 
overall standing of the regions in terms of investment risk. The bivariate correlations between merit 
and impartiality measures on the one hand and the level of investment potential on the other are 
statistically not significant. Significant negative correlation between rigged public procurement ten-
ders (q6_2) and the level of the economic activity of the population (r = 0.28*, N=55) points in the 
same direction: the more overt and covert partiality in the regulation of economic activity in the 
region, the less economically proactive the population is. On the other hand, the rate of business 
participation in the regional decision-making process (q7_9) is positively significantly correlated 
with a number of indicators of the socio-economic development of the regions (Table 12).  
 
TABLE 12, BUSINESS PARTICIPATION: EXTERNAL VALIDATION 
 
  
VARIABLES Business participation 
  
Investments 0.37** 
 (54) 
GDP per capita 0.40** 
 (54) 
InvestRisk (RAE) -0.30* 
 (54) 
InvestRisk (NRA) -0.38** 
 (54) 
InvestPotential 0.35** 
 (54) 
Innovativeness AIRR 0.35** 
 (54) 
Innovativeness HSE 0.29* 
 (54) 
Socio-Econom Index 0.46*** 
 (54) 
  
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Number of observations in parentheses 
 
As expected, in regions where the outcomes of the vacancy contests are pre-determined ahead of 
such contests, both the quality of life and propensity to innovate suffer (Table 11). Furthermore, 
there is a robust negative correlation between partial decisions regarding business (q4_3) and the 
overall measure of socio-economic development of regions (r = 0.45**, N=47). These findings 
suggest that favoritism in the input (recruitment) and output (extent of partiality) of the bureaucrat-
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ic apparatus is closely related to several negative socio-economic trends in Russia’s regions, includ-
ing their innovativeness and the quality of life.  
 
When it comes to the relationship between the adopted elements of New Public Management and 
the socio-economic development of Russia's regions, it was expected, in the first place, that a great-
er extent of implementation of such practices, given the business-like nature of this administrative 
paradigm, will be positively linked with higher economic development of the regions. Secondly, 
considering that strategic planning and performance management (SPPM) processes are at the core 
of the current understanding of effectiveness, it was expected that the higher degree of implemen-
tation of the SPPM tools would be positively linked with the higher effectiveness of regional au-
thorities.  
Table 13 suggests that the first proposition finds by and large support in the data: the more the 
SPPM practices are established in a region, the higher its standing in terms of gross regional prod-
uct per capita, investment potential, innovativeness, quality of life and general socio-economic de-
velopment. A similar picture emerges in relation to the implementation of outsourcing of non-core 
functions by government agencies (Table 13). 
 
The second expectation was subject to empirical test, involving two indices of government effec-
tiveness. The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) Index is a composite measure capturing 
government effectiveness, based on official data from the state statistics office and the data from 
population surveys (MED 2014). The MED Index is overall an indicator accepted in the policy-
making and research communities (Khakhunova 2014). The second index – The Governors' Effec-
tiveness Rating – is produced by a reputable NGO «Fund for Civil Society Development» and 
based on dozens of indicators from a number of different sources, including population surveys, 
official statistics and expert evaluations (FCSD 2015). 
 
Table 14 shows that only one out of the four relationships in question falls below the standard 
threshold of significance. In other words, the hypothesized positive link between indicators of gov-
ernment effectiveness and the extent of institutionalization of the SPPM tools finds sufficient sup-
port in the data, thereby validating the expert survey data.  
 
Overall, the results of the preliminary analysis suggest that the data obtained through the expert 
survey on the quality of government in Russia's regions is credible information about the regional 
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bureaucracies’ structures and practices. First, respondents’ perception bias is small in terms of both 
the share of personal characteristics that rendered statistically significant and the absolute values of 
the statistically significant coefficients. Second, there is sufficient evidence for both the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the data. Third, correlational association between a selection of 
measures on bureaucratic structure and extant indicators of socio-economic development of the 
regions are in line with recent theoretical and empirical literature.  
 
TABLE 13, NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
   
VARIABLES SPPM 
Index 
Outsourcing by government 
agencies  
   
GDP 0.35* 0.40* 
   
InvestRisk (RAE) -0.33* -0.36 
   
InvestRisk (NRA) -0.33* -0.22 
   
InvestPotential 0.43** 0.39* 
   
Innovativeness HSE 0.41** 0.41* 
   
Socioeconomics 0.39** 0.37 
   
Quality of Life  0.44** 0.37 
   
N (49) (27) 
   
      Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
TABLE 14. NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL AUTHORITIES 
   
VARIABLES SPMS 
Index 
Outsourcing by government 
agencies  
   
Effectiveness (MED) 0.18 0.49* 
   
Governors’ effectiveness  0.31* 0.56** 
   
N 49 27 
   
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The dataset 
The Russia’s Regions QoG Expert Survey data are available on both individual and aggregate levels. 
The unit of analysis in the individual version of the dataset is expert. The unit of analysis in the 
aggregated version of the dataset is region. The aggregated data only include those regions for 
which at least three experts answered the survey. When there are not at least three answers for a 
particular question, it is set to missing. The data and corresponding documentation can be found at 
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data. 
 
Suggested data citation: Nistotskaya, Marina, Anna Khakhunova and Carl Dahlström. 2015. The 
Quality of Government in Russia’s regions Expert Survey Report. Gothenburg: The QoG Working Univer-
sity of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.   
 
Suggested report citation: Nistotskaya, Marina, Anna Khakhunova and Carl Dahlström.  2015. The 
Quality of Government in Russia’s regions Expert Survey Report. Gothenburg: The QoG Working Paper 
Series 2015:16 
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APPENDIX 
Appenix 1: List of Regions and Number of Experts 
 
 
Region  
 
Number of  experts 
 
Adygea Respublika 4 
Altay Respublika 1 
Altay kray 8 
Amur region 1 
Arkhangelsk region 3 
Astrakhan region 6 
Bashkortostan Respublika 7 
Belgorod region 6 
Bryansk region 3 
Buriatia Respublika 7 
Vladimir region 3 
Volgograd region 3 
Vologda region 5 
Voronezh region 4 
Dagestan Respublika 6 
Evreyskaya AO 2 
Zabaykalsky kray 3 
Ivanovo region 3 
Ingushetia Respublika 5 
Irkutsk region 7 
Kabardino-Balkariya Respublika 3 
Kalinigrad region 3 
Kalmykia Respublika 4 
Kaluga region 4 
Kamchatsky kray 0 
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya Respublika 3 
Karelia Respublika 5 
Kemerovo region 3 
Kirov region 1 
Komi Respublika 3 
Kostroma region 3 
Krasnodarsky kray 7 
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Krasnoyarsky kray 4 
Kurgan region 4 
Kursk region 7 
Leningrad region 2 
Lipetsk region 5 
Magadan region 0 
Mari-El Respublika 2 
Mordovia Respublika 3 
Moscow 3 
Moscow region 3 
Murmansk region 1 
Nenetsk AD 1 
Nizhny Novgorod region 4 
Novgorod region 3 
Novosibirsk region 2 
Omsk region 5 
Orenburg region 3 
Oreyl region 6 
Penza region 3 
Perm kray 4 
Primorsky kray 9 
Pskov region 5 
Rostov region 4 
Ryazan region 3 
Samara region 6 
Saint-Petersburg 4 
Saratov region 8 
Sakha (Yakutia) Respublika 6 
Sakhalin region 2 
Sverdlovsk region 3 
North Osetiya - Alania Respublika 2 
Smolensk region 6 
Stavropol kray 4 
Tambov region 4 
Tatarstan Respublika 6 
Tver region 1 
Tomsk region 7 
Tula region 4 
Tyva Respublika 3 
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Tumen region 5 
Udmurtiya Respublika 3 
Ulyanovsk region 2 
Khabarovsk kray 4 
Khakassiya Respublika 2 
Khanty-Mansy (Yugra) AD 2 
Cheliabinsk region 4 
Chechnia Respublika 3 
Chuvashiya Respublika 5 
Chukotka AD 0 
Yamal-Nenetsky AD 0 
Yaroslavl region 5 
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Appenix 2: Perception Bias 
 
 
TABLE 15, RESPONDENT PERCEPTION BIAS - QUESTIONS 1, 2, 3, 4 
 
 q1_1 q1_2 q1_3 q1_4 q1_5 q1_6 q1_7 q1_8 q1_9 
Gender 0.612* 0.0436 -0.118 0.344 0.465 0.159 0.0144 1.229*** 0.183 
Education 0.0427 0.187 0.139 0.0848 -0.0190 -0.189 0.128 0.0371 0.118 
State_funded PoW 1.709 -1.928 0.0618 1.078 0.394 0.928 1.021 1.357 3.337* 
Universities_PoW 1.002 -1.746 0.0843 1.234 0.0376 1.175 1.314 0.737 2.921 
Private_NGO_PoW 0.501 -1.316 1.393 -0.206 -1.125 -0.188 1.616 0.218 1.677 
Proper SE-part 0.0148 -0.0108 -0.0089 -0.0068 -0.0069 0.00337 -0.0028 0.00502 0.0113 
N 278 276 280 280 275 271 273 277 266 
 
 q1_10 q1_12 q1_13 
Gender 0.141 -3.500 -0.752* 
Education -0.0562 0.760 0.131 
State_funded PoW 0.263 24.76 0.0543 
Universities_PoW 0.242 17.66 -0.0158 
Private_NGO_PoW -0.240 4.535 1.170 
Proper SE-part 0.00779 -0.0301 -0.0371 
N 252 248 284 
 
 
 q2_1 q2_2 q2_3 
Gender 1.240 -2.447 -4.372 
Education 1.043 -1.307 -2.194 
State_funded PoW -7.230 4.998 -25.03 
Universities_PoW -5.492 14.83 -23.12 
Private_NGO_PoW -0.608 14.84 -11.06 
Proper SE-part -0.261* -0.102 -0.252 
N 270 277 252 
 
 
 q3_1 q3_2 q3_3 q3_4 q3_5 
Gender -0.214 0.286 0.260 0.332 0.0272 
Education 0.0134 0.0820 -0.0228 0.122 -0.101 
State_funded PoW -1.418 0.975 -2.284 3.123 1.358 
Universities_PoW -0.919 0.551 -1.535 2.441 0.678 
Private_NGO_PoW -1.465 -0.151 -0.748 2.753 0.125 
Proper SE-part 0.00829 -0.0205** 0.00761 -0.00615 -0.0238* 
N 262 278 255 260 277 
 
 
 q4_1 q4_2 q4_3 
Gender -0.184 -0.125 -0.0557 
Education 0.0646 0.109 0.0430 
State_funded PoW -1.977 0.820 0.244 
Universities_PoW -1.451 1.129 1.071 
Private_NGO_PoW -0.311 2.094 1.518 
Proper SE-part 0.00633 0.00713 0.00651 
N 273 278 266 
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TABLE 16, RESPONDENT PERCEPTION BIAS - QUESTIONS 5, 6, 7 
 q5_1 q5_2 q5_3 q5_4 
Gender 0.425 0.227 1.037** -1.875 
Education -0.218 -0.224 0.446** -3.047 
State_funded PoW 0.565 -0.0107 -0.659 2.309 
Universities_PoW 0.284 -0.342 -1.451 11.01 
Private_NGO_PoW -0.668 -1.308 -0.633 6.353 
Proper SE-part 0.00231 0.00538 0.00464 0.0561 
N 241 243 223 182 
 
 
 q5_5_1 q5_5_2 q5_5_3 q5_5_4 q5_5_5 q5_5_6 q5_5_7 q5_5_8 q5_5_9 
Gender -2.002 6.649* 3.620* -1.311 4.589* 2.363 3.124 1.625 1.388 
Education 1.709 0.718 -0.714 2.007 0.295 -0.712 2.197 -1.371 0.317 
State_funded PoW -7.520 16.95 -18.12 12.00 -7.603 -10.96 -4.569 2.076 -2.107 
Universities_PoW -3.562 15.38 -18.44 18.73 -13.31 -10.55 2.102 -0.195 -3.230 
Private_NGO_PoW 7.313 11.32 -18.64 26.97 -14.43 -11.57 14.28 -2.629 -5.385 
Proper SE-part 0.0267 0.0879 -0.165** -0.0786 0.0378 -0.0312 -0.127 0.114 -0.0286 
N 284 284 284 282 284 284 284 284 284 
 
 
 q6_1 q6_2 
Gender 0.243 -0.533 
Education -0.192 0.116 
State_funded PoW -3.451 -1.131 
Universities_PoW -2.534 -0.688 
Private_NGO_PoW -2.033 0.928 
Proper SE-part 0.00445 -0.00888 
N 265 277 
 
 
 q7_1 q7_2 q7_3 q7_4 q7_5 
Gender 0.514* 0.529* 0.705* 0.749** 0.510 
Education 0.283* 0.252 0.0287 0.0184 -0.00831 
State_funded_PoW 2.256 3.026* 2.365 3.566* 3.932* 
Universities_PoW 1.521 2.279 1.980 2.744 4.234** 
Private_NGO_PoW 0.759 1.447 0.858 2.031 3.266* 
Proper SE-part -0.0117 0.00354 -0.0147 -0.00552 -0.0175 
N 286 282 278 276 274 
 
 
 q7_6 q7_7 q7_8 q7_9 q7_10 
Gender 0.0225 0.797*** 0.0160 0.204 0.470* 
Education -0.157 0.0111 -0.0429 -0.00513 0.0509 
State_funded_PoW 1.539 0.763 1.781 0.475 1.414 
Universities_PoW 1.551 0.392 1.834 0.496 1.250 
Private_NGO_PoW 0.287 -0.674 2.591* -0.192 0.836 
Proper SE-part -0.0173 -0.00399 -0.0161 -0.0130 -0.00441 
N 273 280 260 277 279 
Note: p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appenix 3: Experts’ Self-estimation 
 
TABLE 17, EXPERTS’ SELF-ESTIMATION 
 SE-part 1 SE-part 2 SE-part 3 SE-part 4 SE-part 5 SE-part 6 SE-part 7 
Gender -0.226* -0.114 -0.0736 -0.0547 -0.167 -0.0567 -0.362** 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
Education 0.0861 0.0532 0.00633 -0.0184 -0.0111 0.0118 -0.00256 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
State_funded_PoW 0.216 -0.00939 0.377* -0.0207 0.117 -0.267 -0.124 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
Universities_PoW 0,157 0.155 -0.015 -0.0495 -0.0955 -0.0717 0.163 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
Private_NGO_PoW -0.415** -0.255 -0.329* 0.125 0.0183 0.262 -0.177 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
SE-part 1 1 0.652*** 0.634*** 0.101 0.408*** 0.235** 0.274** 
N 250 250 249 250 249 250 250 
SE-part 2 0.578*** 1 0.616*** 0.135* 0.390*** 0.319*** 0.343*** 
N 250 250 249 250 249 250 250 
SE-part 3 0.638*** 0.722*** 1 0.126* 0.479*** 0.283** 0.257** 
N 249 249 249 249 248 249 249 
SE-part 4 0.163 0.244* 0.195* 1 0.205* 0.179 0.228* 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
SE-part 5 0.425*** 0.458*** 0.481*** 0.133* 1 0.473*** 0.389*** 
N 249 249 248 250 250 249 250 
SE-part 6 0.167** 0.255*** 0.198** 0.0792 0.322*** 1 0.231** 
N 250 250 249 250 249 250 250 
SE-part 7 -0.212** -0.30*** -0.192** -0.108* -0.285*** -0.253** 1 
N 250 250 249 251 250 250 251 
 
Note: p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Variable Gender: 1 – male, 2 – female. Variable Education: 1 – secondary, 2 – 
secondary special (vocational school), 3 – incomplete higher, 4 – higher (bachelor, specialist), 5 – master, 6 – candidate of  
science, 7 – doctor of  science/PhD. Variable State_funded_PoW: 1 – regional administration, legislative or judicial regional 
authorities, federal state authorities, budgetary agencies (except public institutions of  higher education), and 0 to all other 
employers; variable Universities_PoW: 1 – public institution of  higher education, 0 – all other employers; variable 
Private_NGO_PoW: 1 – the enterprise/organization of  the private sector, non-governmental or private nonprofit organization, 
0 – all other employers. Variables SE-part 1 – 7: experts’ self-estimation in each sphere of  questionnaire respectively. 
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Appenix 4: Questionnaire 
 
 
THE SURVEY QUESTIONS ARE PRESENTED HERE IN ENGLISH 
(ORIGINALLY IN RUSSIAN)  
 
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT IN THE RUSSIA’S REGIONS: THE QUES-
TIONNAIRE 
Note: Explanatory notes aimed at non-Russian readers are in italic, they are not part of the ques-
tionnaire. 
 
1. RECRUITMENT AND CAREER 
Thinking about the region of your expertise, how often do you think the following happens? Possi-
ble answers: Hardly ever (1) 2 3 4 5 6 Almost always (7) D/K 
1.1. When recruiting to regional public administration (to positions known as 
“specialists”* and “support specialists”*), education, professional experience and pro-
fessional skills, identified with the help of vacancy contests, decide who gets the job. 
*such positions are legally guided by the principle of merit in recruitment. 
1.2. When recruiting to regional public administration (to positions known as 
“specialists” and “support specialists”), political connections of the applicants decide 
who gets the job.  
1.3. When recruiting to regional public administration (to positions known as 
“specialists” and “support specialists”), personal connections of the applicants (such 
friendship or kinship) decide who gets the job. 
1.4. Vacancy announcements for positions in regional public administration (to 
positions known as “specialists” and “support specialists”) are easy to find on the offi-
cial websites of the regional administrations, on the Internet, in newspapers and other 
media. 
1.5. These announcements contain detailed information about the professional 
qualities and experience needed for a specific vacancy. 
1.6.  In practice, “specialists” and “support specialists” may develop their ca-
reers up to the very top of the bureaucratic ladder, including positions of the category 
“managers” (which are legally subject to political appointment). 
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1.7.  When it comes to hiring to positions above entry level, public administra-
tors (“specialists” and “support specialists”) have de facto advantage over external can-
didates with roughly similar training and experience. 
1.8.  “The Cadre Reserve” is (a personnel management) tool that serves to at-
tract individuals with the best qualifications and experience to the public service. 
1.9.  The legal provisions governing recruitment, promotion, dismissal and 
remuneration of public administrators are observed in practice. 
1.10. In the event of a dispute over recruitment, job applicants who are dissatis-
fied with how the vacancy contest was carried out or with the decision of the selection 
commission, appeal in court. 
1.12. In your opinion, how many (as a percentage) currently working public administrators (“spe-
cialists” and “support specialists”) were hired via a vacancy contest? 
1.13. Even if formal vacancy contests take place, their outcome is usually decided in advance (in 
XX (respondent fill the number between 0 and 10) out of 10 cases).  
 
2. REPLACEMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS 
2. When a new head of the regional executive is appointed/elected, how many public administra-
tors of the following categories are dismissed and the posts  filled by supporters (sympathizers) of 
the new chief executive?  
 “Specialists” and “support specialists” (low to mid- level, merit personnel 
on permanent contacts)  
 ”Managers” (top layer, at will appointed, on fixed-term contracts) 
 Top managers of the state-funded  (fully or partially)  profit and non-profit 
organizations 
Answers: < 10%, about a quarter, about half, about two-thirds, more than 90%, D/N 
 
3. THE WORKING CONDITIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS 
Thinking about the region of your expertise, to what extent do you agree with the following state-
ments? Answers: Fully agree (1) 2 3 4 5 6 totally disagree (7) D/N 
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3.1. The salaries of public administrators (“specialists” and “support specialists”) in positions of 
managerial responsibility are comparable to salaries of managers in the private sector who have a 
roughly similar training and responsibility level. 
3.2. Individual performance indicators directly affect the pay of public administrators (“specialists” 
and “support specialists”).   
3.3. Bonuses are often distributed based on considerations that have nothing to do with public 
administrators’ diligent performance of duties. 
3.4. The legal provisions guaranteeing job security (permanent contacts) for public administrators 
(“specialists” and “support specialists”) are actually observed and are not affected by organizational, 
political or other changes. 
 
4. IMPARTIALITY 
In accordance with the generally accepted definition, impartiality implies that when making deci-
sions with regard to specific people/organizations, public officials take into consideration nothing 
else but the formal criteria stipulated in the relevant laws and other normative acts (considerations 
such as, for example, the gender, age, ethnic and socio-economic characteristics of the applicant 
should not be taken into consideration). 
Thinking about the region of your expertise, how often do you think the following happens? An-
swers: Hardly ever (1) 2 3 4 5 6 Almost always (7) D/K 
4.1. Public administrators (“specialists” and “support specialists”) act partially in relation to some 
social groups. 
4.2. Public administrators (“specialists” and “support specialists”) treat individuals with whom they 
have direct or indirect personal connections more favorably than other individuals. 
4.3. Public administrators (“specialists” and “support specialists”) treat business applications com-
pleted by individuals with whom they have direct or indirect personal connection more favorably 
than other business applications. 
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5. ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION 
Thinking about the region of your expertise, how often do you think the following happens? An-
swers: Hardly ever (1) 2 3 4 5 6 Almost always (7) D/K 
5.1. The regional public authorities outsource non-core activities and operations. 
5.2. Government agencies and state-funded profit and non-profit organizations that provide medi-
cal, educational and other services outsource non-core activities and operations. 
5.3. Independent audit of the efficiency of budget spending by government agencies and enterprises 
(performed by independent audit organizations selected through open and competitive contests) is 
regularly performed. 
5.4. What, in your opinion, is the share of regional public institutions that currently have the status 
“autonomous”*, including those reorganized by law № 174-FZ (03.11.2006)? Answers: < 10%, 
about 20%, about one third, about half, about two-thirds, about 75%, more than 90%, D/N 
 *the notion of "autonomous" organizations stands for organizations that are funded by the state but have a high 
level of operational autonomy in financial and economic matters 
5.5.1. In your opinion, what is the portion of public (including government agencies and organiza-
tions that are partially or fully funded by the state), private and third sector organizations that oper-
ate in the provision of health care services?  
5.5.2. In your opinion, what is the portion of public (including government agencies and organiza-
tion that are partially or fully funded by the state), private and third sector organizations that oper-
ate in the provision of education services?  
5.5.3. In your opinion, what is the portion of public (including government agencies and organiza-
tion that are partially or fully funded by the state), private and third sector organization that operate 
in the provision of social services (including welfare, sports, culture, recreation, ecology, etc.)?  
For each question 5.5.1- 5.5.3 respondents provide three numerical answers, the sum of which 
cannot exceed 100%. 
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6. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT TENDERS 
Thinking about the region of your expertise, to what extent do you agree with the following state-
ments? Answers: Fully agree (1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Totally disagree (10) D/N 
6.1. Public procurement contracts are usually concluded with organizations which are single bidders 
or organizations whose bid was the only one that met all the formal requirements.  
6.2. Even if competitive public procurement tenders take place, the outcomes of these tenders are 
usually pre-determined in advance.    
 
7. POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING  
Thinking about the region of your expertise, how often do you think the following happens? An-
swers: Hardly ever (1) 2 3 4 5 6 Almost always (7) D/K 
7.1. Regional policies and programs usually contain a set of well-developed specific goals and objec-
tives.  
7.2. Regional policies and programs usually contain a set of well-defined specific performance indi-
cators. 
7.3. Funding of the subsequent stages of policies/programs depends on performance evaluation of 
the previous stages.  
7.4. Policies/programs are usually adjusted based according to performance evaluation of the pre-
vious stages. 
7.5. The planning and implementation of regional policies/programs is carried out jointly by differ-
ent organizational units of regional government.  
7.6. In everyday decision-making senior public administrators (“managers”) have considerable au-
tonomy. 
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7.7. In everyday decision-making public administrators (“specialists” and “support specialists”) are 
governed by standard operating procedures, contained in their job descriptions, service provision 
standards, policy and other documents. 
7.8. If an oral order of supervisors contradicts the written document regulating everyday decision-
making, public administrators follow the oral order given by their superiors. 
7.9. Representatives of business organizations are involved in the process of political decision-
making in matters of general socio-economic development and/or those pertaining to their inter-
ests.  
7.10. Representatives of non-governmental and non-profit organizations are involved in the pro-
cess of political decision-making relating to matters pertaining to their interests.  
 
8. FINAL SECTION  
8.1. What is your gender? Male / Female 
8.2. What is the level of your education? Please choose the response category that best describes 
your level of education: secondary, secondary special (vocational school), incomplete higher, higher 
(bachelor), higher (specialist), MA, candidate of science, doctor of science/PhD, none of the above. 
8.3. Who do you work for? Please choose the response category that best describes your current 
employer: regional administration, the regional legislative or judicial authorities, the federal state 
authorities, one of the budgetary agencies (except for public institutions of higher education), pub-
lic institutions of higher education, an enterprise/organization in the private sector, a non-
governmental or private nonprofit organization, temporarily not working/retired, none of the 
above. 
8.4. How do you assess the extent to which the following sections* of the questionnaire fall within 
the scope of your expertise? Absolutely / Rather fall / Rather don’t fall / Not at all / D/N 
* 7 substantive sections of the questionnaire 
8.5. If you have any comments about this survey, please provide them in the space below. 
